Rethinking Informal Payments by Patients in Europe: An Institutional Approach by Williams, C.C. & Horodnic, A.V.
This is a repository copy of Rethinking Informal Payments by Patients in Europe: An 
Institutional Approach.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/120649/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Williams, C.C. orcid.org/0000-0002-3610-1933 and Horodnic, A.V. (2017) Rethinking 
Informal Payments by Patients in Europe: An Institutional Approach. Health Policy, 121 
(10). pp. 1053-1062. ISSN 0168-8510 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.08.007
Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
RETHINKING INFORMAL PAYMENTS BY PATIENTS IN EUROPE: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
 
Colin C. Williams and Adrian V. Horodnic  
 
Professor Colin C. Williams is Professor of Public Policy in the Management School at the University of Sheffield 
in the United Kingdom. 
'U $GULDQ 9 +RURGQLF LV DQ $VVLVWDQW 3URIHVVRU RI (WKLFV DQG +HDOWK (FRQRPLFV DW ³*ULJRUH 7 3RSD´
University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Romania 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to explain informal payments by patients to healthcare professionals 
for the first time through the lens of institutional theory as arising when there are formal 
institutional imperfections and asymmetry between norms, values and practices and the 
codified formal laws and regulations. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the 
prevalence of informal payments by patients in 28 European countries, a strong association is 
revealed between the degree to which formal and informal institutions are unaligned and the 
propensity to make informal payments. The association between informal payments and formal 
institutional imperfections is then explored to evaluate which structural conditions might 
reduce this institutional asymmetry, and thus the propensity to make informal payments. The 
paper concludes by exploring the implications for tackling such informal practices. 
 
Keywords: informal payments, institutional theory, institutional asymmetry, health policy, 
European Union. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades or so, a growing literature reveals how patients in many countries 
around the world, particularly in the former communist countries and other low and middle 
income countries, use informal payments to seek either better treatment [1-6], an additional 
service [7], due to their fear of being denied treatment [5,8]EHFDXVHWKH³GRFWRUGHPDQGHG
SD\PHQW´ [4], because there is a tradition of giving a gift to express gratitude [4,5,9] or just 
³EHFDXVHHYHU\ERG\GRHVLW´[4]. Given that some 35-60% of patients make informal payments 
in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine [10], tackling this phenomenon 
can be seen as central and essential to building a healthcare system which is not based on bribes 
and corruption, and provides more equal access [11-13]. 
The aim of this paper is to advance and evaluate a new way of explaining and tackling 
informal patient payments. Until now, institutional theory [14,15] has been widely applied in 
health services research and related fields to evaluate for example the adoption of health 
information technology [16-18], healthcare reform policies in public systems [19], patient-
centred preventive care [20] and healthcare expenditure [21]. In this paper, and drawing 
inspiration from the application of institutional theory to the study of informal economic 
practices beyond healthcare [22,23], we here for the first time analyse informal payments to 
patients through the lens of institutional theory.  
Viewed through this institutional lens, two approaches to understanding informal 
payments by patients can be adopted. On the one hand, informal payments to patients can be 
viewed as resulting from formal institutional imperfections in healthcare services. Indeed, 
previous literature on the structural conditions that lead to informal payments has identified a 
number of structural conditions, including legal-ethical, social-cultural (the social custom of 
expressing gratitude through informal payments), governance failures (e.g. poor 
accountability) and economic (e.g. underfunding in the face of growing healthcare needs and 
expectations; explanations based on economic behaviour) conditions [11,24-26]. On the other 
hand, however, and reflecting the advances in institutional theory when studying other informal 
practices [22,23]LWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVDUH³WKHUXOHVRIWKHJDPH´ZKLFKSUHVFULEH
what is socially acceptable, and thus both constrain and encourage different types of activity 
[15]. In all societies, there are not only formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regulations) 
WKDWOD\RXWWKHOHJDOUXOHVRIWKHJDPHEXWDOVRLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZKLFKDUHWKH³VRFLDOO\
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned chDQQHOV´ [27, p.727]. Informal payments will thus arise when the norms, 
practices and values of the informal institutions are not in symmetry with the formal rules of 
the game. Indeed, the greater the institutional asymmetry, the greater is the likelihood of 
informal payments by patients. Until now, neither the formal institutional imperfections nor 
the institutional asymmetry thesis have been evaluated as explanations for informal payments 
by patients. This paper seeks to fill that gap.  
To begin to evaluate these institutional explanations, section 2 briefly reviews the 
previous literature on informal patient payments. The outcome will be a set of hypotheses 
regarding the association between informal patient payments and the degree of asymmetry 
between formal and informal institutions as well as the association between informal patient 
payments and formal institutional imperfections. To start to test these hypotheses, section 3 
then reports the data used, namely a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 21,121 face-to-face 
interviews with patients in the 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28), and the 
analytical methods employed (multi-level logistic regression). The fourth section then reports 
the results on the relationship between the propensity to make informal patient payments and 
institutional asymmetry, and how this institutional incongruence and thus the prevalence of 
informal patient payments might be reduced. The final section draws conclusions on the policy 
implications of this new way of understanding informal patient payments. 
Before commencing however informal patient payments have to be defined. A 
definition [28] is provided by Gaal et al. [29] according to whom, informal patient payments 
UHSUHVHQWµDGLUHFWFRQWULEXWLRQZKLFKLVPDGHLQDGGLWLRQWRDQ\FRQWULEXWLRQGHWHUPLQHGE\
the terms of entitlement, in cash or in kind, by patients or others acting on their behalf, to health 
care providers IRUVHUYLFHVWKDWWKHSDWLHQWVDUHHQWLWOHGWR¶7KLVSKHQRPHQRQLValso known in 
OLWHUDWXUHDVµXQGHU-the-WDEOH¶SD\PHQWV [13], under-the-counter payments [6,13] or unofficial 
payments [7]. 
 
Explaining the informal patient payments: an institutional approach 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, a burgeoning literature has revealed how, especially in 
developing and transition countries, patients make an additional informal payment to the 
medical staff apart from the official fees for medical services. This has been identified in studies 
conducted in large geographical areas, such as in 35 European countries [26], Central Asia [30] 
as well as in 33 African countries [31], or in smaller studies comprising only one nation as, for 
example, Bulgaria [1,6,13,32,33], Poland [34,35], Hungary [2,36-40], Greece [4,41], Lithuania 
[34,42], Russia [43,44]; Ukraine [34,45], Moldova [46], Serbia [47], Kazakhstan [48], Albania 
[5,49,50], Kosovo [8], Tajikistan [51,52], Kyrgyzstan [53], Taiwan [54], Cameroon [55], 
Tanzania [3,56] and Turkey [57]. Nevertheless, informal patient payments phenomenon is 
poorly examined at a cross-country level. Examining the prevalence of this informal practice, 
previous studies reveal considerable cross-national variations in the proportion of patients who 
make informal payments, ranging from 50% in Tajikistan [52], 43% in Bulgaria [13], 36% in 
Greece [4], 29% in Turkey [57], 25% in Moldova [46] and 23% in Russia [44]. 
To explain these cross-national variations in the commonality of informal payments by 
patients, such payments are for the first time here analysed through the lens of institutional 
theory [15]. Following advances in institutional theory in relation to the study of broader 
informal economic practices, it can be argued that all societies have both codified laws and 
regulations (i.e., formal institutions) that define the legal rules of the game [14,15,58], as well 
DVLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZKLFKDUHWKHµVRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\XQZULWWHQWKDWDUHFUHDWHG
communicated and enforFHGRXWVLGHRIRIILFLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV¶[27, p.727]. When there 
is asymmetry between these codified laws and regulations (formal institutions) and the socially 
shared unwritten rules (informal institutions), the result is the emergence of practices based on 
XQZULWWHQVRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVZKLFKDUHµLOOHJLWLPDWH¶ LQ WHUPVRIWKHIRUPDOZULWWHQUXOHV
Informal payments to patients can be thus seen to result from this institutional asymmetry. The 
greater the institutional asymmetry, the higher is the prevalence of informal payments. Whether 
health services can be treated theoretically in the same way as other informal practices (e.g., 
buying food products) is open to discussion, especially when the decision to pay (or not) to 
skip a queue can be a matter of life and death in some instances. Here therefore, and to test 
whether the likelihood to make informal payments to medical staff is associated with the degree 
of asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, the following hypothesis is proposed 
for investigation: 
 
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H1): the propensity to make informal payments is 
higher in populations with greater asymmetry between their formal and informal 
institutions. 
 
Indeed, most previous studies reveal that women are more likely to make informal payments 
for health care services [6,40,42,46,59], as do younger persons [6,45,47,49,60], better educated 
persons [6, 40-42,47,49], those having a job [41], those married [49], those living in a smaller 
household [40,49,50], those living in rural areas [45,60,61], and those with lower income 
[31,37,57,61]. By testing this hypothesis, whether these populations also have a higher 
institutional asymmetry can be evaluated. 
 It is important however, not only to test this new institutional asymmetry thesis. 
Institutional asymmetry is propounded to exist due to formal institutional imperfections. 
Viewed through this institutional lens, therefore, the structural conditions that previous 
literature has identified as associated with the greater prevalence of informal payments need to 
be evaluated as both determinants of, and ways of tackling, the level of institutional asymmetry. 
As previous studies reveal, these formal institutional imperfections include not only the 
existence of formal institutional voids, such as lower expenditures on healthcare [6] and 
inefficient resource allocation which results in a low range and reach of healthcare services 
[12,25,26,39,44,62], but also formal institutional inefficiencies, such as the poor quality of 
government, poorer performing healthcare systems and those concentrating on curative rather 
than preventative care [12,24-26,33,34,43,61]. To test whether these formal institutional voids 
and inefficiencies are associated with greater levels of informal payment, the following 
hypotheses can be thus evaluated:  
 
Formal institutional imperfections hypothesis (H2): the propensity to make informal 
payments is higher in health systems with greater formal institutional imperfections. 
 
Formal institutional voids (H2A): the propensity to make informal payments is higher 
in health systems with greater formal institutional voids. 
Lack of financial resources (H2A1): the propensity to make informal payments is 
higher in health systems with low expenditures on health. 
Lack of a basic health service (H2A2): the propensity to make informal payments 
is higher in health systems with a low range and reach of service provision. 
 
Formal institutional inefficiencies (H2B): the propensity to make informal payments 
is higher in countries with greater formal institutional inefficiencies. 
Quality of government (H2B1): the propensity to make informal payments is higher 
in countries with a lower quality of government. 
Health system performance (H2B2): the propensity to make informal payments is 
higher in health systems with lower performance levels. 
Resource misallocations (H2B3): the propensity to make informal payments is 
higher in health systems focusing on curative health services rather than prevention.    
 
Methodology 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between the likelihood of patients making informal 
payments and the degree of institutional asymmetry, along with the explanations relating to 
formal institutional imperfections, we here use an extensive dataset, namely Special 
(XUREDURPHWHU1Rµ&RUUXSWLRQ¶FRQGXFWHGDVSDUWRIZDYHRIthe Eurobarometer 
survey [63]. This survey involved 27,786 face-to-face interviews conducted during February 
and March 2013 across the 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28), of which 21,121 
were conducted with citizens who had visited a public healthcare practitioner or institution in 
the past 12 months. Interviews were carried out in the national language with adults aged 15 
years and older, based on a common questionnaire and a multi-stage random (probability) 
sampling methodology to ensure that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, each 
country as well as each level of sample was representative in proportion to its population size. 
Those respondents with missing values were excluded from the analysis, resulting in a sample 
of 20,278 respondents being used for analytical purposes. For the univariate analysis therefore, 
we employed the sampling weighting scheme as recommended in the wider literature [64,65] 
and the Eurobarometer methodology [66]. Regarding the multivariate analysis, debate exists 
over whether such a weighting scheme should be used [64,67,68]. Considering the majority 
opinion in the literature and previous studies on informality [e.g. 59] we here decided not to 
use the weighting scheme for the multivariate analysis. 
 In this study, the dependent variable is whether patients made extra informal payments 
apart from the official fees. This is based RQWKHLUUHVSRQVHWRWKHTXHVWLRQµ$SDUWIURPRIILFLDO
fees did you have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift to a nurse or a doctor, or make a 
GRQDWLRQWRWKHKRVSLWDO"¶ To analyse H1 regarding whether the propensity to make informal 
payments is associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry, an Institutional Asymmetry 
Index for each respondent is constructed. Participants were asked to rate on a 3-point Likert 
scale (where 1 means always acceptable and 3 means never acceptable) the acceptability of 
three behaviours, namely: a) to give money, b) to give a gift or c) to do a favour, in order to get 
something from the public administration or a public service. The index has been calculated 
here using the mean score across these three attitudinal questions. A lower index value indicates 
WKDWWKHQRUPVYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIVRIDVRFLHW\¶VLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHnot aligned with those 
of the formal institutions (i.e., SDWLHQWV DUH QRW VHHNLQJ WR DGKHUH WR WKH µOHJDO UXOHV RI WKH
JDPH¶. The lower the index value, the higher is the institutional asymmetry. 
Meanwhile, to analyse the relationship between informal payments and formal 
institutional imperfections (H2), akin to previous studies on informal payments, various 
country-level structural conditions are considered [e.g. 24,69,70], whilst holding constant the 
Institutional Asymmetry Index and a range of individual-level variables (gender, age, marital 
status, household composition, occupation, difficulties paying bills and community size). 
Similar socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial characteristics were used in previous 
studies evaluating informal patient payments [39,71]. Despite the existence of some minor 
associations between these individual-level variables, such as age and occupation, they are not 
sufficiently substantial to cause serious multi-collinearity problems.    
 To evaluate the lack of financial resources hypothesis (H2A1) and the lack of a basic 
health service hypothesis (H2A2), the indicators used are: 
 Level of total expenditure on health expressed as a percentage of GDP [72]. 
 Per capita total expenditure on health expressed in Purchasing Power Parities (PPP 
international dollars) to facilitate international comparisons [73]. 
 Range and reach of health services provided in a country ± sub-discipline in Euro 
Health Consumer Index, 2013 [74]. 
To evaluate the relationship between informal patient payments and governance (H2B1) and 
health system performance (H2B2), the analysed indicators are: 
 European Quality of Government Index ± this includes both perceptions and 
experiences with public sector services. The index is standardised with a mean of zero, 
with higher scores implying a higher quality of government [75]. 
 Outcomes ± sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 2013 [74]. 
 Death rate, crude per 1000 people [72]. 
For evaluating resource misallocations by formal institutions, such as when focusing on 
curative health services rather than prevention, two indicators are used: 
 Hospital beds per 100000 inhabitants [76]. 
 Prevention ± sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 2013 [74].  
To evaluate our hypotheses, after using a descriptive analysis, a multi-level mixed logistic 
regression analysis is conducted, utilising the hierarchical nature of the data, namely 
individuals within countries. Given the significant correlation between the macro-level 
indicators (Table A2 in Appendix), each country-level structural condition is added in turn to 
the individual-level variables (i.e., the Institutional Asymmetry Index and socio-economic 
control variables) to evaluate whether they are significantly associated with the propensity to 
make informal payments.         
Thus, our logit random intercept model specification is the following [77]: 
 ሺ ߨ௜௝ ? െ ߨ௜௝ሻ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝ ൅  ߚଶ ௝ܺ ൅ ݑ௝ 
 
where, ߚ଴ is the overall intercept, ߚଵ is the cluster specific effect, ߚଶ is the contextual effect, ܺ௜௝ is the vector with individual level explanatory variables, ௝ܺ is the vector with country level 
explanatory variables and ݑ௝  is the group (random) effect. 
Below, we report the findings. 
Findings 
 
Of the 27,786 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 in EU-28, 21,121 had visited a public 
healthcare practitioner or institution in the past 12 months, of whom one in 21 (4.7%) had made 
informal payments for a public healthcare service. Extrapolating from this, in the year prior to 
the survey, approximately 18 million of the 388 million Europeans visiting a public healthcare 
institution made informal payments. 
Not all countries and not all population groups display the same propensity to make 
informal payments. As Table 1 displays, this practice is more common in East-Central Europe 
where 9% of patients make informal payments, compared with 4% in Western Europe, 3% in 
Southern Europe and less than 1% in Nordic countries. It is similarly the case that informal 
payments are not distributed evenly across nations. Table 1 reveals that the share of patients 
reporting informal payments is higher in Romania (28%), Lithuania (21%), Greece (11%) and 
Hungary (10%) and lower in Finland, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg and 
United Kingdom (less than 1%). Moreover, although just 18% of the patients surveyed were 
from Romania and Lithuania, more than half (54%) of those making informal payments in 
East-Central Europe were from these two countries, displaying how this practice is therefore 
heavily concentrated in these countries in East-Central Europe. Similarly, in Western Europe 
informal payments are concentrated in Germany (although just 32% of patients surveyed, they 
constituted 60% of all patients making informal payments in Western Europe), while in 
Southern Europe such payments are relatively concentrated in Greece (Table 1). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Not only is the practice of making informal payments concentrated in certain countries, it is 
also more prevalent in some patient groups rather than others. Examining the patient groups 
more likely to make informal payments, the finding is that patients aged 40-54 years are more 
likely to give extra payments or valuable gifts for healthcare services than younger patients 
(5% compared with 3%). Indeed, although just 26% of the patients surveyed were aged between 
40-54 years old, they constituted 29% of all patients making informal payments. Married 
patients or those living with a partner are more likely than unmarried patients to make informal 
payments (5% compared with 3%). So too are patients who face difficulties in paying their 
bills more likely to make informal payments than those who never, or almost never, have 
difficulties. Indeed, although 61% of the patients surveyed had few difficulties in paying their 
bills (almost never/never), only 47% of informal payments involved such patients. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
To evaluate whether these cross-national and socio-economic variations in informal payments 
are related with the level of institutional asymmetry, the final columns of Table 1 and Table 2 
report the variations in the Institutional Asymmetry Index. This reveals that Institutional 
Asymmetry Index is lower (and thus institutional asymmetry is greater) in East-Central Europe 
(2.64), compared with Western Europe (2.79), Southern Europe (2.80) or Nordic nations (2.87). 
Indeed, most of the post-communist countries in East-Central Europe experiencing high 
prevalence rates of informal patient payments are reporting higher levels of institutional 
asymmetry: 2.39 in Hungary and Lithuania, 2.40 in Latvia, 2.43 in Slovakia, 2.57 in Czech 
Republic and 2.63 in Romania. Similarly, with a value of 2.59, Greece has a high level of 
institutional asymmetry. Lower levels of institutional asymmetry, meanwhile, exist in Finland 
(2.93), Portugal (2.88), Malta (2.87), Sweden (2.86) and Denmark (2.83). Turning to the socio-
economic variations in the Institutional Asymmetry Index, the final column in Table 2 shows 
that no important fluctuation could be identified in the analysed data.  
Analysing these descriptive statistics therefore, the tentative finding is that, although 
ubiquitous across all regions and socio-economic groups, informal payments are more common 
in areas where there is a higher level of asymmetry between formal and informal institutions.  
To determine firstly, whether the association between informal payments and 
institutional asymmetry (H1) is significant when other control variables are taken into account 
and held constant, and secondly, to investigate the country-level structural conditions (formal 
institutional imperfections ± H2) associated with a higher propensity to make informal 
payments, we here report the results of a multi-level logistic regression. Indeed, estimating a 
baseline random intercept model with no explanatory variables, the likelihood-ratio test for the 
null hypothesis that there are no variations in the prevalence of informal payments displays that 
this can be rejected. This analysis shows that over 27% of the variance in informal payments 
was accounted for at the country level (Wald = 12.02, df=1, p<0.001), indicating that multilevel 
mixed-effects logistic regression should be used. Table 3 reports the results. The first stage of 
the analysis involves individual-level characteristics and the second stage both individual-l and 
country-level variables (details on the variables used in the analysis are in Table A1 in 
Appendix).   
    
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The first row in Models 1-11 in Table 3 reveals that the propensity to make informal payments 
is strongly associated with higher levels of institutional asymmetry (i.e., a low Institutional 
Asymmetry Index) across all models, whether only individual-level variables are analysed, or 
country-level structural conditions are added. As institutional asymmetry increases, the 
propensity to make informal payments significantly increases (confirming H1). Moreover, 
Model 1 identifies that patients in single-person households are more likely to make informal 
payments, as are those aged 40-54 years old. When adding socio-economic individual-level 
characteristics in Model 2, the finding is that informal payments are significantly less prevalent 
among those who have never or almost never had difficulties in paying their bills. Adding 
spatial variables in Model 3, meanwhile, reveals that patients in East-Central Europe are 
significantly more likely to make informal payments than patients in any other EU region. 
However, no strong significant correlation with informal payments is found with respect to 
gender, marital status, occupation or size of the community where the patient lives.        
Models 4-11 in Table 3 meanwhile, test the formal institutional imperfection hypothesis 
(H2) to explain informal payments. Models 4 and 5 reveal that the prevalence of informal 
payments is higher in countries with lower levels of health expenditure in GDP or per capita 
terms. These models thus confirm that the propensity to make informal payments is greater in 
health systems with low expenditure levels on health (H2A1). To evaluate the lack of a basic 
health service hypothesis, Model 6 provides strong evidence that informal payments are more 
likely in health systems with a low range and reach of services provision (confirming H2A2). 
Turning to the formal institutional inefficiencies, Models 7-9 reveal strong evidence 
that informal payments are higher in countries with lower qualities of government (confirming 
H2B1), and low health outcomes and high death rates (confirming H2B2). Resource 
misallocation as another formal institutional inefficiency is evaluated in Model 10 and Model 
11. The finding is that informal payments are more likely in health systems focusing on curative 
health services (large number of beds per 100000 inhabitants) rather than preventive services 
(low quality preventive care), confirming H2B3.     
To better analyse the relationship between informal patient payments, institutional 
asymmetry and formal institutional imperfections and to help interpret the findings, Figure 1 
presents WKH SUHGLFWHG SUREDELOLWLHV RI D µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ (XURSHDQ SDWLHQW PDNLQJ LQIRUPDO
payments by their level of institutional asymmetry and various country-level structural 
conditions. By taking the mean and modal values of other independent variables, the 
representative European patient is here a 55+ years-old unemployed women, married or single 
with a partner, living in a household with two persons or more, located in a small or middle 
sized town, who never or almost never has financial difficulties in paying the household bills. 
As graphically displayed in Figure 1.A-H, as institutional asymmetry decreases and country-
level structural conditions improve, the predicted odds of this representative patient making 
informal payments becomes smaller. These graphs clearly reveal how patients living in 
countries with higher expenditure levels on health (Figure 1.A,B), large range and reach of 
health service provision (Figure 1.C), higher qualities of government (Figure 1.D), a higher-
performing health system (Figure 1.E,F), and oriented towards prevention (Figure 1.H) rather 
than curative health services (Figure 1.G), have lower predicted odds of making informal 
payments. The consequence is that it can be asserted that formal institutional failings appear to 
engender greater institutional asymmetry and consequently higher predicted odds of making 
informal payments.  
 
Discussion  
 
This paper has advanced a new way of explaining informal payments by patients. Drawing 
upon institutional theory, it has displayed that, when formal and informal institutions are not 
aligned, informal practices emerge embedded in unwritten socially shared rules that are 
µLOOHJLWLPDWH¶LQWHrms of the formal written rules. The higher is the asymmetry between formal 
and informal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of such informal practices. Using 
multilevel logistic regression analysis, this has been shown to be the case when both the 
individual level variables were solely analysed (i.e., socio-economic characteristics) and when 
country level variables (i.e. structural conditions related with formal institutional 
imperfections) were analysed along with the individual-level ones. 
To reduce informal payments therefore, it will be necessary to reduce this institutional 
asymmetry. This requires changes in not only the norms, practices and beliefs that constitute 
the informal institutions but also in the formal institutions by tackling the formal institutional 
imperfections that lead to institutional asymmetry and thus informal payments. 
To alter the informal institutions, three policy initiatives can be pursued. Firstly, 
advertising campaigns (targeting the groups identified above with high levels of institutional 
asymmetry) can be used, which can inform patients of the costs and risks of making informal 
payments to the medical staff. Secondly, normative appeals to both patients and medical staff 
can be used to try to curb the tendency to pay for/ask for ask informal payments. Indeed, as 
previous studies show, anticorruption measures combined with awareness campaigns have 
proved to be a potent approach for tackling informal patient payments in East European 
countries [10,45]. And third and finally, tax education is required to inform citizens and patients 
about the benefits of paying taxes so as to pay for public services such as healthcare (e.g., so 
that higher salaries can be paid). If successful, the medical staff would no longer feel they need 
informal payments and patients would no longer feel the need to make such informal payments.  
To improve the social contract between governments and patients and medical staff 
nevertheless, formal institutions also need to change. On the one hand, and as models 4, 5 and 
6 in Table 3 reveal, informal payments are more common in systems with low expenditure on 
health and a low range and reach of services provision. On the other hand, and as models 7-11 
in Table 3 display, governments also need modernisation and to pursue wider economic and 
social developments. These models clearly reveal how countries with lower quality of 
government, lower health outcomes, high death rates and systems focusing on curative health 
services rather than preventive services, have a higher prevalence of informal payments. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In sum, this paper has advanced a new way of understanding informal payments by patients 
using the lens of institutional theory. This has revealed that informal payments by patients in 
Europe are indeed higher when there are formal institutional failings and an asymmetry 
between the norms, beliefs and practices and the codified laws and regulations. This 
quantitative analysis, however, has been unable to explore in any depth the question of why 
patients decide to make informal payments. This will require qualitative research in order to 
complement these quantitative findings by exploring in more depth the social relations and 
motives involved in informal payments by patients.    
Whether this institutional asymmetry approach is more widely relevant when 
explaining and tackling informal payments beyond the European Union in other global regions 
also now needs to be evaluated. If this paper stimulates such evaluations using the lens of 
institutional theory in a wider range of geographical contexts, then one of the intentions of this 
paper will have been achieved. If it also encourages governments to recognise how informal 
payments result from such institutional asymmetry and to begin exploring how this can be 
tackled, and to evaluate different policy measures and combinations of policy measures, then 
it will have achieved its fuller intention. 
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Table 1. Distribution of informal payments in the EU28: by region and country 
      
Region/ Country 
Patients 
surveyed 
Informal 
payments 
Percent of all 
patients making 
informal 
payments 
Percent of 
all patients 
Institutional 
Asymmetry 
Index 
(no.) (%) (%) (%) - 
EU 28 21,121 4.72 -- -- 2.77 
East-Central Europe 8,090 8.88 100 100 2.64 
Romania 525 27.52 46.06 14.85 2.63 
Lithuania 777 21.04 8.21 3.47 2.39 
Hungary 751 9.75 10.76 9.80 2.39 
Slovakia 827 8.84 5.97 6.00 2.43 
Bulgaria 680 8.25 6.65 7.17 2.68 
Latvia 789 6.66 1.38 1.84 2.40 
Czech Republic 786 3.87 4.90 11.25 2.57 
Poland 743 3.19 13.69 38.11 2.76 
Slovenia 750 3.18 0.75 2.10 2.84 
Estonia 745 3.05 0.39 1.12 2.72 
Croatia 717 2.57 1.24 4.29 2.65 
Western Europe 6,949 4.36 100 100 2.79 
Germany 1,264 8.05 59.54 32.28 2.79 
France 934 4.74 28.10 25.87 2.81 
Austria 814 3.26 2.49 3.33 2.71 
Ireland 724 2.14 0.76 1.56 2.80 
Belgium 889 1.92 1.98 4.51 2.81 
United Kingdom 1,049 0.98 5.76 25.52 2.79 
Luxembourg 450 0.95 0.05 0.24 2.82 
Netherlands 825 0.86 1.32 6.69 2.79 
Southern Europe 3,601 2.92 100 100 2.80 
Greece 621 10.59 23.68 6.54 2.59 
Italy 728 3.79 59.67 46.03 2.81 
Cyprus 315 2.23 0.39 0.51 2.76 
Portugal 794 1.93 5.08 7.70 2.88 
Malta 335 1.71 0.15 0.25 2.87 
Spain 808 0.83 11.03 38.97 2.82 
Nordic Nations 2,481 0.64 100 100 2.87 
Sweden 806 0.88 62.20 44.99 2.86 
Denmark 867 0.60 27.75 29.46 2.83 
Finland 808 0.25 10.05 25.55 2.93 
      
 
  
Table 2. Distribution of informal payments in the EU28: by socio-demographic and socio-
economic characteristics 
     
n = 21,121 Informal 
payments 
Percent of all 
patients making 
informal 
payments 
Percent of all 
patients 
Institutional 
Asymmetry 
Index 
(%) (%) (%) - 
All EU 28 4.72 100 100 2.77 
Gender     
Male 4.41 42.47 45.43 2.77 
Female 4.98 57.53 54.57 2.77 
Age     
15-24  3.16 8.33 12.46 2.68 
25-39 4.62 22.76 23.25 2.74 
40-54 5.33 28.84 25.53 2.80 
55+ 4.88 40.07 38.76 2.80 
Marital status     
Unmarried 3.09 12.29 18.80 2.75 
(Re)Married/Single with a partner 5.24 72.92 65.88 2.77 
Divorced or separated 4.17 5.76 6.55 2.80 
Widowed 4.87 9.03 8.77 2.77 
Household composition     
One person 4.60 18.51 19.00 2.79 
Two and more 4.75 81.49 81.00 2.76 
Occupation     
Self-employed 4.41 6.74 7.22 2.76 
Employed 4.98 41.92 39.77 2.77 
Not working 4.57 51.35 53.01 2.77 
Difficulties paying bills last year     
Most of the time 5.39 15.15 13.17 2.75 
Time to time 5.67 31.42 25.98 2.73 
Almost never\ Never 4.12 53.43 60.85 2.79 
Community size     
Rural/ Village 4.91 35.00 33.70 2.78 
Small/ Middle sized town 4.53 39.16 40.85 2.77 
Large town 4.80 25.84 25.45 2.76 
     
 
 
  
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to make informal payments by 
socio-demographic, socio-economic, spatial characteristics and institutional imperfections  
             
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed part E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Constant -0.367  0.298 0.693 -0.172  0.336 0.842 0.349  0.362 1.418 
Institutional Asymmetry Index -1.244 *** 0.071 0.288 -1.244 *** 0.071 0.288 -1.235 *** 0.071 0.291 
Gender (Male)             
Female 0.124 * 0.070 1.132 0.122 * 0.071 1.130 0.118 * 0.071 1.126 
Age (15-24 years)             
25-39 0.278 * 0.147 1.321 0.296 * 0.154 1.345 0.292 * 0.154 1.340 
40-54 0.300 ** 0.149 1.350 0.332 ** 0.157 1.394 0.339 ** 0.157 1.403 
55+ 0.182  0.151 1.199 0.229  0.154 1.257 0.236  0.154 1.266 
Marital status (Unmarried)             
(Re)Married/Single with a partner 0.206 * 0.123 1.229 0.208 * 0.124 1.231 0.215 * 0.124 1.240 
Divorced or separated 0.073  0.159 1.076 0.030  0.161 1.030 0.023  0.161 1.023 
Widowed -0.093  0.158 0.911 -0.101  0.159 0.904 -0.103  0.159 0.902 
Household composition (One person)            
Two and more -0.265 ** 0.116 0.767 -0.259 ** 0.117 0.772 -0.257 ** 0.117 0.773 
Occupation (Self-employed)             
Employed     -0.139  0.142 0.870 -0.150  0.142 0.860 
Not working     -0.105  0.146 0.900 -0.107  0.146 0.898 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)          
Time to time     0.005  0.098 1.005 0.006  0.098 1.006 
Almost never\ Never     -0.233 ** 0.102 0.792 -0.223 ** 0.102 0.800 
Community size (Rural/ Village)             
Small/ Middle sized town         0.127  0.085 1.136 
Large town         0.141  0.088 1.151 
Region (East-Central Europe)             
Southern Europe         -0.841 ** 0.405 0.431 
Western Europe         -0.873 ** 0.365 0.418 
Nordic Nations         -2.067 *** 0.564 0.127 
N 20,549 20,294 20,278 
Random part    
Country-level variance 0.9634*** 0.9115*** 0.5595*** 
(Standard error) 0.2830 0.2686 0.1647 
Countries 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 22.65 21.69 14.53 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in 
brackets. 
    
  
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to make informal payments by 
socio-demographic, socio-economic, spatial characteristics and institutional imperfections ± 
continued  
                 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Fixed part E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Constant 1.571 * 0.879 4.811 7.797 *** 2.425 2.434 2.493 *** 0.554 12.09 -0.205  0.314 0.814 
Institutional 
Asymmetry Index -1.239 *** 0.071 0.290 -1.237 *** 0.071 0.290 -1.236 *** 0.071 0.291 -1.236 *** 0.071 0.291 
Gender (Male)             
Female 0.120 * 0.071 1.127 0.120 * 0.071 1.127 0.119 * 0.071 1.127 0.119 * 0.071 1.126 
Age (15-24 years)             
25-39 0.294 * 0.154 1.342 0.294 * 0.154 1.342 0.293 * 0.154 1.340 0.290 * 0.154 1.336 
40-54 0.340 ** 0.157 1.405 0.340 ** 0.157 1.405 0.339 ** 0.157 1.403 0.335 ** 0.157 1.398 
55+ 0.236 0.154 1.266 0.234 0.154 1.264 0.232 0.154 1.262 0.229 0.154 1.257 
Marital status (Unmarried)                
(Re)Married/Single 
with a partner 0.214 * 0.124 1.238 0.214 * 0.124 1.239 0.213 * 0.124 1.238 0.215 * 0.124 1.240 
Divorced or separated 0.023 0.161 1.023 0.022 0.161 1.022 0.024 0.161 1.025 0.026 0.161 1.026 
Widowed -0.101 0.159 0.904 -0.102 0.159 0.903 -0.103 0.159 0.902 -0.104 0.159 0.901 
Household composition (One person)              
Two and more -0.254 ** 0.117 0.776 -0.255 ** 0.117 0.775 -0.260 ** 0.117 0.771 -0.262 ** 0.117 0.770 
Occupation (Self-employed)                
Employed -0.150 0.142 0.861 -0.151 0.142 0.860 -0.143 0.142 0.867 -0.145 0.142 0.865 
Not working -0.107 0.146 0.898 -0.108 0.146 0.897 -0.103 0.146 0.903 -0.105 0.146 0.900 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)          
Time to time 0.008 0.098 1.008 0.011 0.098 1.011 0.014 0.098 1.014 0.012 0.098 1.012 
Almost never\ Never -0.226 ** 0.102 0.797 -0.220 ** 0.102 0.803 -0.206 ** 0.102 0.814 -0.208 ** 0.102 0.812 
Community size (Rural/ Village)               
Small/ Middle sized 
town 0.123 0.085 1.131 0.125 0.085 1.133 0.120 0.085 1.128 0.125 0.085 1.134 
Large town 0.138 0.088 1.148 0.136 0.088 1.146 0.131 0.088 1.140 0.136 0.088 1.146 
Health expenditure, %  
of GDP (2013) -0.210 ** 0.094 0.810          
Health Expenditure/ Capita, log PPP (2013) -1.024 *** 0.306 0.359       
Range and reach of services provided1 (2013)    -0.027 *** 0.005 0.973    
EQI (2013)          -0.738 *** 0.149 0.478 
N 20,278 20,278 20,278 20,278 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.7572*** 0.6306*** 0.3758*** 0.4542*** 
(Standard error) 0.2251 0.1879 0.1154 0.1365 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 18.71 16.08 10.25 12.13 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
1
 Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index (2013) 
              
  
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the propensity to make informal payments by 
socio-demographic, socio-economic, spatial characteristics and institutional imperfections ± 
continued  
                 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Fixed part E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Constant 2.288 *** 0.703 9.859 -3.133 *** 0.802 0.044 -10.41 *** 2.702 0.001 2.660 *** 0.993 14.30 
Institutional 
Asymmetry Index -1.236 *** 0.071 0.290 -1.237 *** 0.071 0.290 -1.241 *** 0.071 0.289 -1.237 *** 0.071 0.290 
Gender (Male)                 
Female 0.119 * 0.071 1.127 0.120 * 0.071 1.128 0.119 * 0.071 1.126 0.119 * 0.071 1.126 
Age (15-24 years)                 
25-39 0.292 * 0.154 1.340 0.296 * 0.154 1.344 0.296 * 0.154 1.344 0.295 * 0.154 1.343 
40-54 0.339 ** 0.157 1.403 0.341 ** 0.157 1.406 0.341 ** 0.157 1.407 0.340 ** 0.157 1.405 
55+ 0.234 0.154 1.263 0.233 0.154 1.263 0.236 0.154 1.267 0.234 0.154 1.263 
Marital status (Unmarried)                
(Re)Married/Single 
with a partner 0.214 * 0.124 1.238 0.214 * 0.125 1.239 0.214 * 0.125 1.239 0.215 * 0.125 1.240 
Divorced or separated 0.023 0.161 1.023 0.020 0.161 1.020 0.018 0.161 1.018 0.022 0.161 1.022 
Widowed -0.104 0.159 0.902 -0.100 0.159 0.905 -0.098 0.159 0.906 -0.098 0.159 0.906 
Household composition (One person)             
Two and more -0.256 ** 0.117 0.774 -0.250 ** 0.117 0.779 -0.248 ** 0.117 0.780 -0.252 ** 0.117 0.777 
Occupation (Self-employed)                
Employed -0.150 0.142 0.860 -0.157 0.142 0.855 -0.156 0.142 0.856 -0.152 0.142 0.859 
Not working -0.109 0.146 0.897 -0.111 0.146 0.895 -0.110 0.146 0.895 -0.108 0.146 0.898 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Most of the time)            
Time to time 0.010 0.098 1.010 0.009 0.098 1.009 0.004 0.098 1.004 0.007 0.098 1.007 
Almost never\ Never -0.219 ** 0.102 0.803 -0.227 ** 0.102 0.797 -0.239 ** 0.102 0.787 -0.230 ** 0.102 0.794 
Community size (Rural/ Village)              
Small/ Middle sized 
town 0.128 0.085 1.137 0.120 0.085 1.128 0.124 0.085 1.133 0.124 0.085 1.132 
Large town 0.138 0.088 1.148 0.133 0.088 1.142 0.141 0.088 1.152 0.137 0.088 1.147 
Outcomes1 (2013) -0.016 *** 0.004 0.984          
Death rate, crude per 1000 people (2013) 0.283 *** 0.071 1.327       
Hospital beds per 100000 inhabitants (log, 2013)   1.640 *** 0.432 5.154    
Prevention1 (2013)          -0.035 *** 0.012 0.965 
N 20,278 20,278 20,278 20,278 
Random part     
Country-level variance 0.5534*** 0.5481*** 0.5615*** 0.6557*** 
(Standard error) 0.1665 0.1669 0.1727 0.1968 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 14.40 14.28 14.58 16.62 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
1
 Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index (2013) 
                 
 
  
A 
 
B 
 
    
C 
 
D 
 
    
E 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
G 
 
H 
 
 Legend: 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted probability of making 
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patient: by Institutional Asymmetry Level 
and country-level structural conditions   
 
